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Abstract. This paper contributes to the clarification of a design science epistemology. It 
presents different epistemic types related to three stages of the design science process: 
1) Evaluative and explanatory background knowledge (pre-design knowledge), 2) prospec-
tive knowledge with design hypotheses (in-design knowledge) and 3) prescriptive knowl-
edge with design principles (post-design knowledge). The epistemological inquiry adopts 
a pragmatist approach and is pursued through a review of design science literature and 
informed by an empirical design case on digital support for social welfare allowances. 
The clarified design science epistemology shows a diversified epistemological landscape 
with several epistemic types: evaluative, critical, appreciative, normative, explanatory, 
prospective, prescriptive, categorial and attributive knowledge. Ways to express these 
epistemic types have been proposed in principal clauses. Ways of grounding have been 
clarified for each epistemic type. Proposals are given on how to utilize the design sci-
ence epistemology in relation to design science process models and publication schemas. 
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After the articulation of design science (DS) as a legitimate research approach in in-
formation systems (March and Smith, 1995; Hevner et al, 2004), there has been a 
growth of such kind of research. There existed, of course, design-oriented research in 
information systems (IS) earlier, but those scholars framed their research in other ways. 
Even after the labeling and promotion of the design science approach in IS, not all such 
research studies self-identify themselves as design science. In an investigation of the use 
of design science in digital government, Fedorowicz and Dias (2010) identify that “few 
digital government studies self-identify as belonging to this research paradigm; others 
present their technological artifact as a case study without grounding in a common 
methodology or design science framework or theory” (ibid. p. 6). There is no reason to 
believe that this situation is restricted to digital government, but appears in many other 
domains of IS research.
Following the seminal paper of Hevner et al (2004) there has been an intense work 
conducted by IS scholars of filling the different gaps of this approach; for example 
process descriptions (e.g.,Peffers et al. 2007), design theorizing (e.g.,Gregor and Jones 
2007; Lee et al. 2011), evaluation principles and methods (e.g.,Sonnenberg and vom 
Brocke 2012; Prat et al. 2015; Venable et al. 2016), relations to similar approaches 
such as action research (Sein et al. 2011), how to write a DS paper (Gregor and Hevner 
2013). There have also been discussions about the paradigmatic roots of design science. 
Most scholars identify the scientific foundations to come from the seminal work of 
“the sciences of the artificial” (Simon 1996) and “the science of design” (a chapter in 
Simon 1996; reprinted as Simon 1988). This means a science of the artificially designed 
as opposed to a science of the naturally given. Paradigmatic analyses of the ontology, 
epistemology, and methodology of design science have been conducted by Gregg et 
al. (2001), Purao (2002) and Iivari (2007), although these do not make any clear po-
sitioning within an established research paradigm. There exist however proposals how 
to position DS paradigmatically. Niehaves (2007) attempts to position DS within an 
interpretivist paradigm. Carlsson (2010) attempts to position DS within critical real-
ism. There are several proposals to position DS within a pragmatist paradigm (Hevner 
et al. 2004; Hevner 2007; Cole et al. 2005; Lee and Nickerson 2010; Goldkuhl 2012ab; 
Ågerfalk and Wiberg 2018). There exists obviously no consensus within the IS research 
community about paradigmatic foundations of design science. There exist of course 
many challenges in DS concerning the practical conduct of designing, since these tasks 
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are demanding as they require imaginative and technical skills. Besides this, design 
science seems to comprise great challenges and uncertainties concerning its epistemo-
logical character. There are uncertainties of what kind of outcomes from DS that is 
mandatory or just optional. There exist different opinions and claims concerning design 
science outcomes: A useful artifact, design principles, design theory or kernel theory 
improvement.
Design science has been contrasted to ‘behavioral science’ (Hevner et al. 2004). The 
forerunner of that paper (i.e.,March and Smith 1995) used the corresponding notion 
of natural science. Classical behavioral science is concerned with what-is, i.e.,giving 
truthful and abstracted accounts of an already existing world. Such an approach produc-
es results (descriptions, explanations) that are epistemologically well established. The 
idea of DS is to work with what-might-be instead of what-is. The outcomes of design 
science do not have such a clear epistemological character as behavioral science. Hevner 
et al. (2004) claim that the corresponding function in DS is utility, instead of truth as 
it appears in behavioral science. This claim is however about the artifact, which is not 
an epistemic claim as a truth claim is.
There are several contributions describing the nature of design theory as being pre-
scriptive (Walls et al. 1992; Kuechler and Vaishnavi 2012). Is it so simple that behavio-
ral science operates within epistemic functions of descriptive and explanatory character 
and design science within prescriptive functions? These epistemological issues need to 
be further addressed. The need for such efforts is well argued by two of the main actors 
within the IS DS movement, Gregor and Hevner (2013) who state: “We contend that 
ongoing confusion and misunderstandings of DSR’s central ideas and goals are hin-
dering DSR from having a more striking influence on the IS field. A key problem that 
underlies this confusion is less than full understanding of how DSR relates to human 
knowledge.” (ibid. p. 338). It is of great importance that IS scholars engaging in design 
science are aware of fundamental epistemological challenges and discourses in order to 
avoid naïve and dubious knowledge contributions. Hovorka (2010, p. 24) writes: “To 
assume-away or to simply ignore the significant debates surrounding the production 
and validation of knowledge would be a disservice to design science research and reduce 
its validity as a process of knowledge creation”. Barquet et al. (2017, p. 398) have also 
identified a “relative absence of established ways to develop and communicate knowl-
edge contributions from design-oriented research within information systems”. Confer 
also Niehaves (2007) and Baskerville et al. (2015) about needs for further epistemolog-
ical clarifications.
There is thus an obvious need for clarification of knowledge types in design sci-
ence studies. A continued epistemological confusion among DS scholars may obstruct 
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an effective execution of DS studies as well as scholarly discourses on methodological 
principles. A goal is to have DS researchers well equipped with a set of clearly defined 
knowledge types in design science.
A note on terminology is needed; what to call this kind of research where design ef-
forts play a decisive role? The terminology is not yet settled and stable in IS and neither 
outside IS. In IS, there exist labels such as “system development research” (Nunamaker 
et al. 1991), “design-oriented research” (Barquet et al. 2017; Niehaves 2007; Sjöström 
and Ågerfalk 2009), “design research” (Cole et al. 2005; Hevner and Chatterjee 2010; 
Purao 2002), “design science” (Hevner et al. 2004; Iivari 2007; Johannesson and Perjons 
2014; Niehaves, 2007), “design science research” (Gregor and Hevner 2013; Hevner et 
al. 2004; Kuechler and Vaishnavi 2012). Some examples of shifting terminology out-
side IS are: “research through design” in HCI (Zimmerman and Forlizzi 2014), “design 
science” in management (van Aken 2004); “design-oriented research” in research meth-
odology (Verschuren and Hartog 2005). I have chosen to use the succinct label ‘design 
science’ through this text. This seems also be in accordance with the programmatic 
statement by Simon (1988; 1996) about the “science of design”.
1.2 Purpose and focus
There is a need for an inquiry into the epistemology of design science. Epistemology 
is concerned with the nature of knowledge, its sources, and justification (Steup 2018). 
How should we epistemologically characterize the knowledge contributions from de-
sign science? The purpose of this paper is to conduct an inquiry into design science 
epistemology (DSE) in order to arrive at a systematized and more exhaustive account of 
knowledge contributions that are made within and from design science studies and the 
inherent epistemic types of such knowledge contributions. The aim is thus to contrib-
ute to a re-conceptualization of design science knowledge contributions by exploring its 
epistemic functions; i.e.,to arrive at a useful classification of epistemic types in design 
science studies. Why is this important? The idea of clarifying design science episte-
mology is 1) to further enhance our understanding of this kind of emergent research 
approach within IS and 2) to give DS scholars a firm base for conducting and gauging 
IS DS concerning what kinds of epistemic claims that can and should be raised con-
cerning such research.
Design science in IS can be performed concerning different kinds of artifacts. March 
and Smith (1995) stated that four kinds of DS outcomes could be designed and studied 
in design science (constructs, methods, models, instantiations). It is clear that a DS 
approach has been used in IS research for a magnitude of artifacts and design objects. 
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Knowledge is needed for how to conduct design research for different types of artifacts. 
This presented paper will have a clear focus on the development of IT artifacts, IS arti-
facts, digital artifacts or whatever we call this core phenomenon of IS research. An IT 
artifact, as being a socio-technical artifact (Silver and Markus 2013), is always embed-
ded in a social practice context (Orlikowski and Iacono 2001). The design and study of 
such artifacts need to take into account its social practice context. The primary focus, 
in this paper, is thus IT artifacts as designed objects and the epistemology concerned 
with this. This means a focus on design as product. This entails also an interest in the 
epistemic logic of the design process.
This focus has been chosen since it seems most urgent to deal with these epistemo-
logical matters for IS design science. It is also important not to blur results from this 
epistemological inquiry with other possible design objects (as methods and models). 
Future research should investigate epistemological issues for those other types of arti-
facts. The presented research here can be one possible source for such research.
2 Research approach
2.1 A pragmatist inquiry on epistemology
This research has been conducted through an inquiry. This notion is here used in its 
pragmatist sense (Dewey 1910; 1938; Thayer 1981; Cronen 2001). An inquiry starts 
with the experience of an indeterminate and problematic situation and it ends with a 
transformed situation into a determinate one. This transformation, of an initial prob-
lematic situation into a settled and determinate one, passes through different inquiry 
stages; problem formulation, proposal formulation, abstract reasoning and testing of 
proposals (ibid.). The research aim is to arrive at an improved conceptualization of de-
sign science epistemology. This means that a conceptual analysis is needed. Prominent 
design science literature is investigated with an epistemological perspective. The DS 
literature is studied concerning different knowledge items with the purpose to make 
their epistemic types explicit.
The inquiry is not restricted to literature analysis and conceptual refinement. The 
DSE conceptualization has emerged through an alternation between conceptual analy-
sis and empirical work. This author has experiences from several design science studies 
(Sjöström and Goldkuhl 2009; Goldkuhl and Lind 2010; Goldkuhl 2011; Goldkuhl 
2012a; Eriksson and Goldkuhl 2013; Goldkuhl et al. 2015; Goldkuhl 2016). These DS 
experiences have of course influenced the emergence of this epistemological conceptu-
5
Goldkuhl: Design Science Epistemology.  A pragmatist inquiry
Published by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL),
© Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, 2020 32(1), 39–80
Goldkuhl:
Design Science Epistemology44
alization. One empirical case of design research has been selected for use in this paper. 
This case has been used as an important vehicle in this inquiry. It has been used in a 
generative fashion for analysis, illustration, and formulation of design science epistemic 
types. This case has also been used as a means for testing the adequacy and applicability 
of the proposed DS epistemic types.
2.2 Epistemic type
The central concept in this inquiry is epistemic type. Different possible knowledge items 
within design science are epistemologically characterized, i.e.,different epistemic types 
are assigned to the identified DS knowledge items. This work with epistemic types is 
mainly inspired by the communicative action theory of Habermas (1984). This theory 
builds on a rational view of knowledge and its validity. To claim the validity of knowl-
edge means that good reasons as arguments are presented in order to make the knowl-
edge trustworthy and adequate. 
Habermas (1984) states in an explicit way that different character of knowledge 
(expressed in different forms of sentences) requires different validity claims or forms of 
grounding. ”Starting from the analysis of sentence forms, we can go on to clarify the 
semantic conditions under which corresponding sentence is valid. …. [T]he meaning 
of grounding changes in specific ways with changes in sentence form.” (ibid. p. 39). 
This can be illustrated by the difference between a description and a prescription. Con-
cerning descriptions, the main validity claim is truth. A description is valued if it is true 
or not. A valid description is a true one. A prescription is not valued concerning truth 
claims. Instead, it is valued concerning appropriateness. This is the case since descrip-
tions and prescriptions are of different epistemic types. The epistemic character of a 
description (as a sentence) is that it gives a correct account of something that exists. The 
epistemic type of a prescription (as a sentence) is that it gives a useful recommendation 
for creating something to become.
Habermas’ theory is harmonious with the pragmatist stance of this inquiry. Express-
ing sentences (as knowledge representations) are seen as communicative actions. This 
is also the case concerning explicit validity claims of such sentences/communicative 
actions. Such validity claims can be seen as meta-discursive actions.
2.3 Structure
The inquiry on DSE is presented in the following according to this disposition: The 
problematic situation and the need for inquiry (the research question) have been pre-
sented in the initial section above (1). After the elaboration of research approach in 
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this section (2), it follows in the next section (3) an epistemological analysis of design 
science literature. This analysis leads to a conceptualization of an epistemic logic of the de-
sign science process and a preliminary list of epistemic types in design science. The following 
section (4) presents and investigates an empirical design case (digital transfer in social 
welfare allowances). The author has first-hand experience from this case. The case illus-
trates different epistemic types of knowledge items related to the identified epistemic 
logic of the design science process. Based on the literature analysis and the empirical 
case analysis, a coherent conceptualization of DSE is presented in the following section 
(5). This fulfills the transformation into a settled and determinate situation of the in-
quiry. The paper ends with discussion and conclusions (6). In this concluding section, 
possible uses of this design science epistemology are discussed.
3 Assumed epistemic types in design science
3.1 Design science process and knowledge creation
Hevner et al. (2004) describe design science in a fairly simple way to consist of 
build-evaluate cycles. This condensed view has been expanded by several other scholars 
into different process models. Kuechler and Vaishnavi (2012) have expanded the build 
phase into three (iterative) stages: 1) problem awareness, 2) suggestion and 3) devel-
opment. A similar model is found in Peffers et al. (2007). In their model, there is an 
explicit stage on “define objectives of a solution” after the problem formulation stage. 
Several scholars have explored the role and constituents of evaluation in DS. Vena-
ble et al. (2016) have presented a framework for evaluation in design science. They dis-
tinguish between 1) why to evaluate, 2) what to evaluate, 3) when to evaluate (ex-ante 
or ex-post), and 4) how to evaluate (in artificial or naturalistic settings). The temporal 
dimension has been further elaborated by Sonnenberg and vom Brocke (2012). They 
identify four different evaluation points in the design science process: 1) before design 
which means an evaluation of the problematic situation, 2) after design, but before 
construction, 3) after construction but before use (e.g.,through the use of prototypes) 
and 4) after use in its practice context. There are several suggestions in the literature 
concerning criteria for evaluation. General criteria for evaluating the IT artifact (instan-
tiation) are suggested by March and Smith (1995, p. 261), “efficiency and effectiveness 
of the artifact and its impact on the environment and its users” and Hevner et al. (2004, 
p. 85), “utility, quality, and efficacy of a design artifact”. One important insight, ac-
counted for above, was the conduct of evaluation in different stages of the DS process. 
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Sonnenberg and vom Brocke (2012) and Verschuren and Hartog (2005) differentiate 
and relate criteria to different stage-types of evaluation. Confer also Prat et al. (2015) 
and Baskerville et al. (2015). One important conclusion from reading the literature on 
design science evaluation is that there are criteria expressing values both concerning 
the artifact and the use-context. We can speak of artifact-centric criteria and user/us-
age-centric criteria. However, sometimes these distinctions are blurred.
3.2 Knowledge abstraction in design science
The main outcome from design science in IS is considered to be an artifact following 
Hevner et al. (2004): “The result of design-science research in IS is, by definition, a 
purposeful IT artifact created to address an important organizational problem” (ibid. 
p. 82). In their seminal paper, there is a reluctance to include theories and other ab-
stractions as results from DS; a position that has been softened in later publications 
(e.g.,Gregor and Hevner 2013). 
Many scholars have advocated for a DS process characterized by different levels 
of abstractness. The DS knowledge development is often characterized by alternating 
between two layers of abstractness, although the labels are differing, as “abstract knowl-
edge” vs. “concrete knowledge” (Sjöström and Ågerfalk 2009); “abstract knowledge” vs. 
“situational knowledge” (Goldkuhl and Lind 2010; Barquet et al. 2017); “abstract do-
main” vs. “instance domain” (Lee et al. 2011); “generic artifacts” vs. “situated artifacts” 
(Winter 2014); “nomothetic knowledge” vs. “idiographic knowledge” (Baskerville et al. 
2015). It is clear in some of these publications, indicated in others, that the DS process 
is characterized by a continual movement back-and-forth between an abstract knowl-
edge layer and a concrete/situational layer. This implies also the generation of inter-
mediary knowledge as well as final DS knowledge contributions. Knowledge elements 
within DS can be 1) utilized (as exterior input), 2) generated and used as intermediaries 
within the DS process, and 3) generated as final outcomes from the DS endeavor.
3.3 Design theory and epistemic types
Design theory is considered, by several scholars, to be a main outcome from a design 
science endeavor. There are several contributions concerning constituents and structure 
of design theory. A pioneer contribution was made by Walls et al. (1992). A design 
theory is seen as a prescriptive theory integrating explanatory, predictive and normative 
knowledge (ibid.). The explanatory part of the theory is made up of so-called kernel 
theories, i.e.,background theories that could inform the prescriptive parts of the theory. 
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This means that other theories may be imported and integrated into the proposed de-
sign theory. A design theory comprises prescriptive knowledge for both design process 
and design product. The prescriptive essence of the design theory for the design product 
consists of meta-requirements, as “a class of goals”, and “meta-design”, as “a class of 
artifacts meeting the meta-requirements” (ibid. p. 42).
The relationships between explanatory knowledge and prescriptive knowledge in 
design theories were more thoroughly described by Goldkuhl (2004). An explanatory 
statement (of cause-to-effect type) can be transformed into a prescriptive statement 
(of means-to-end type) if the effect is considered to be desirable, i.e.,a goal. Goldkuhl 
(2004) emphasizes a multi-grounding approach to design theory; besides 1) an empiri-
cal grounding there should be 2) an internal grounding and 3) a theoretical grounding 
consisting of explanatory, normative (value) and conceptual grounding. The relation-
ships and integration of conceptual, explanatory, normative and prescriptive knowledge 
in design theories are thus made explicit by Goldkuhl (2004). Kuechler and Vaishna-
vi (2012) build on Walls et al. (1992) and Goldkuhl (2004) when developing their 
framework for theory development in IS design science. They claim the importance of 
translating and adapting explanatory kernel theories to the specific circumstances of IS 
design (design relevant explanatory/predictive theory). Besides formal kernel theories, 
they also want to include tacit knowledge (experiences and insights) as a basis for the 
generation of design theory.
The importance to include explanatory background knowledge (kernel theories) 
is also emphasized by Gregor and Jones (2007). In their work on the anatomy of an 
IS design theory they include “justificatory knowledge” (equivalent to kernel theory) 
as a basis for proposed prescriptions. Gregor and Jones (2007) have transformed and 
expanded the Walls et al. (1992) design theory approach. Instead of “meta-require-
ments”, Gregor and Jones speak of “purpose and scope of the system” and instead of 
“meta-design”, they speak of “principle of form and function as an abstract ‘blueprint’ 
or architecture that describes an IS artifact” (ibid. p. 322). They have also provided ad-
ditional elements to a design theory. The key constructs (entities of interest) have been 
made explicit. Anticipated state changes of an artifact (artifact mutability) have also 
been added.
Winter (2014) has also made a contribution to design theorizing, where he em-
phasizes the distinction between descriptive (explanatory) and prescriptive knowledge. 
Although it is easy to agree with this difference analytically, it seems that this author 
over-emphasizes such a difference. “It should be carefully differentiated whether ‘the-
ory-type’ statements relate cause and effect (explanatory and/or predictive theory) or 
relate means and end (design theory). This line separates two ‘worlds’, the world of 
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descriptive artifacts and the world of prescriptive artifacts.” (ibid. p. 5). As stated above, 
the difference between cause-to-effect and means-to-end lies in whether the effect is 
considered as a desired state (an end).
In a review of different design theory anatomies, like Walls et al. (1992) and Gregor 
and Jones (2007), Baskerville and Pries-Heje (2010) claim that these approaches are 
“overly complicated” (ibid. p. 271). As a reaction to this, they propose that design the-
ories should be divided into two distinct classes; 1) design practice theory and 2) design 
theory of design objects. The latter should be reduced to just consist of explanatory 
statements. These are described to be functional explanations stating relations between 
object features and requirements. However, their conceptualization of requirements 
seems to differ from Walls et al. (1992). They speak of “capability or conditions … 
possessed by a system” (Baskerville and Pries-Heje 2010, p. 274). It seems to be a focus 
on the means, and the ends (goals) are somewhat implied; “… needed by a user to solve 
a problem or achieve an objective” (ibid.). This type of explanatory clause of Baskerville 
and Pries-Heje (2010) has been further investigated by Niehaves and Ortbach (2016), 
where they emphasize the potential existence of multi-causality relationships between 
independent and dependent variables.
A similar design theory approach can be found in Venable (2006) who speaks of 
utility functions between 1) technological solutions and 2) business needs for problem 
resolution. Instead of explanations or prescriptions, he characterizes this theoretical 
knowledge to be predictive. Baskerville and Pries-Heje (2010) emphasize their similar 
theoretical clause to be explanatory but acknowledge its nature of being constructive 
and prescriptive as well. This is fully in line with the accounts in Goldkuhl (2004) and 
Kuechler and Vaishnavi (2012).
Not all design abstractions are made in the form of a complete design theory. Gregor 
and Hevner (2013) talk about nascent design theories that can consist of “constructs, 
methods, models, design principles, technological rules” (ibid. p. 342). The Action De-
sign Research approach of Sein et al. (2011) explicitly uses the notion of design principle 
as an outcome of applying their approach. They do not present a clear definition of a 
design principle (although claiming it to represent design knowledge), but when study-
ing their empirical case a clear pattern arises. A design principle is seen as some specific 
feature of an artifact and it can be related to desired (and sometimes unanticipated and 
undesired) consequences among users. They speak of the need for “an assessment of the 
artifact and design principles that it represents” (ibid. p. 42). There are other prescrip-
tive knowledge contributions expressed in the DS literature. Dwiwedi et al. (2014) have 
made a literature review and have identified different types of DS knowledge contri-
butions. Many of these seem to be of prescriptive nature (guideline, design principle, 
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design pattern, design requirement, design recommendation, generative mechanism), 
however not yet matured to an explicit design theory level.
What epistemic types are assumed in the above reviewed design theory approach-
es? Most approaches claim the role of design theory to be prescriptive. There are how-
ever differences between how elements of prescriptive statements are conceptualized 
and labeled. Explanatory knowledge is also included in these design theory types; 1) 
sometimes as externally provided background theories (kernel theories), 2) sometimes 
as transformed and adapted background knowledge and 3) sometimes as explanatory 
equivalents of stated prescriptions or predictions. Value knowledge is explicitly included 
in some design theory approaches, but given different labels (meta-requirement, goal, 
purpose). In other approaches, it is rather kept implicit. The importance to stress key 
concepts in design theory is made by Goldkuhl (2004), “conceptual grounding”, Gregor 
and Jones (2007), “constructs as entities of interest” and Winter (2014), “foundational 
constructs”. Confer also the DS knowledge type “definitional knowledge” by Johannes-
son and Perjons (2014). This type of knowledge will be called categorial knowledge in 
the following.
3.4 An epistemic logic of the design science process
Design theory is seen as a fundamental outcome of DS research. Different epistemic 
functions of design theory have been indicated above. But, how about other types of 
knowledge in the DS process? Evaluation is not only used, as described above, for a 
final and summative evaluation of an IT artifact in use with the purpose of validating 
design theory. There are formative uses of evaluation during the DS process in order to 
improve knowledge concerning design. Evaluation plays generative roles in the design 
process when contributing with knowledge to direct the design in fruitful paths. As can 
be derived from DS process descriptions (e.g.,Peffers et al. 2007; Kuechler and Vaishna-
vi 2012) there are several knowledge contributions made in the design process. For 
example, there is knowledge about problematic situations, about objectives and values, 
and also about proposals for design. There may be evaluations made with reference to 
these different situations and objects.
Design science has been characterized as concerned with knowledge about a world-
to-be as contrasted with a world-as-is. This is only partially true. Design science starts 
with a world-as-is (comprising its deficiencies and unexplored opportunities) and tries 
to transform it into a desirable world-to-be. Knowledge about the world-as-is is funda-
mental for the DS process. Such knowledge is however not a strictly neutral description 
of prevailing circumstances. The knowledge about current practices is based on implicit 
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or explicit assessments. Several DS scholars state that problem formulation is the start-
ing point of DS (Hevner et al. 2004; Peffers et al. 2007; Sein et al. 2011). Knowledge 
about problems and current practices forms a fundamental background knowledge for 
the design process in DS. This kind of knowledge is descriptive, but a more appropriate 
epistemic characterization is to state that it is evaluative knowledge. Problems aren’t just 
there. They depend on human assessments of current affairs. This is an initial stage in 
all kinds of inquiries, triggered by experiences of difficulties and disturbances, and try-
ing to find out “what works” and “what does not work” (Dewey 1910; 1938). More or 
less explicit in this evaluation and problem investigation are the values and goals of the 
practices. Problems and difficulties exist as deviations from what is desired.
Besides such a situational knowledge, there may also be an influence from extant 
abstract knowledge with relevance for the design topic; i.e.,what is called kernel theory 
by several scholars; cf. discussion above. Kernel theory is not generated within the DS 
process, but it is selected and furnished to the knowledge process and it is, therefore, 
pertinent to include it in an epistemological analysis.
Design science is about a possible world; a world that might come into existence. 
Fundamentally in IS design science is ideas about 1) better IT artifacts and 2) that 
these artifacts will improve human practices. The ideational character of DS needs to 
be accounted for. Artifact ideas are suggestions and proposals, which are continually 
developed and shaped during the design process. This ideational knowledge can be epis-
temologically characterized as prospective knowledge; i.e.,knowledge about the possible. 
The world-to-be is, however, not only a possible world. It is also a desirable world, which 
accounts for normative knowledge of goals and values.
Design science is not only about creating ideas about a future situation. It tries 
through building and intervention to create such future states; i.e.,designed artifacts 
and improved practices. After arriving at these new states, the corresponding knowledge 
about these changes needs to be articulated. Sometimes it is said that it is sufficient 
with a designed artifact as the result from DS research; a so-called proof-of-concept 
(Nunamaker et al. 2015). The artifact encapsulates knowledge about itself. Howev-
er, from a scientific perspective, this knowledge needs to be extracted and justified in 
separate scholarly descriptions. Descriptions of artifacts and their use-effects should be 
articulated in the form of design principles or design theories. Such accounts can be 
said to function as prescriptive knowledge (Goldkuhl 2004; van Aken 2004); i.e.,how 
should we act in design (what artifact properties to strive for) in order to reach certain 
goals (improved states in use-practices).
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An epistemic logic of the design science process can be formulated as a result of this 
analysis. Three stages can be identified with their respective knowledge types. This is 




Kind of knowledge Epistemic type
Corresponding 
world state
Pre-design 1) Situational knowledge about 
problems and practice context
2) Abstract extant knowledge 
selected for potential use 
(kernel theory)
1) Evaluative background 
knowledge
2) Explanatory background 
knowledge
World-as-is
In-design Ideas and proposals; 
values and goals






Knowledge about artifact 
properties with related impact 
on use-situations
Prescriptive knowledge World-as-become 
and world-to-
become
Table 1. Types of knowledge and related world-states in the design science process
This epistemic logic of the design science process will be illustrated in the empirical 
case description below (section 4) and further elaborated in the clarified design science 
epistemology (section 5).
3.5 A preliminary list of epistemic types
This epistemological analysis of the design science literature has identified several dif-
ferent epistemic types. Table 1 describes three phases of the design science process and 
their associated main knowledge types. There are, however, more knowledge types iden-
tified through the epistemological analysis above. The following epistemic types have 
been identified and these will be furthered as candidates for the DS epistemological 
classification to come (section 5 below): Explanatory knowledge, predictive knowledge, 
normative knowledge, prescriptive knowledge, categorial knowledge, evaluative knowl-
edge, and prospective knowledge.
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4 An empirical design case: Digital transfer in social 
welfare allowances
In order to clarify different epistemological issues in IS design science, parts of an em-
pirical DS case will be used. There will be no comprehensive description of this case. 
More detailed accounts of results have been presented elsewhere (Goldkuhl 2012a; 
Eriksson and Goldkuhl 2013; Goldkuhl 2016). The case description is not used to 
present a comprehensive process description or resulting design theory. The aim of this 
case description is to use it in an appropriate way for this inquiry on DS epistemology. 
The purpose of this case presentation is to empirically illustrate and analyze knowl-
edge items of a design science process in order to state different epistemic types. The 
design case is concerned with digital transfer in social welfare allowances. The author 
has participated in a longitudinal e-government development concerning social welfare 
allowances. This project can be characterized as combined action research and design 
research.
4.1 Evaluation of current situation
A short presentation of the workpractice and its digital development follows: The re-
sponsibility for social welfare allowances resides within welfare boards of municipalities. 
People with severe problems to make a living can apply for social welfare allowances. 
It is necessary for municipal welfare officers to check the total economic situation (in-
cluding other allowances) for an applicant. A social welfare officer needs to contact 
different national agencies and inquire if other allowances are given to the client. In 
the design project, we developed a multi-query application that digitally sends queries 
to several national agencies (e.g.,the Social Insurance Agency and the Board for Study 
Support). Immediate answers are obtained digitally and they are exposed to the social 
welfare officers in the multi-query application. This communication was earlier mainly 
conducted through telephone calls and for a minority of authorities through a slow 
batch query application.
The development of new IT artifacts started from problematic situations in the case 
handling of social welfare allowances. It was confirmed that sometimes erroneous de-
cisions were made by the social welfare boards concerning social welfare allowances. It 
could be in either way; the clients could get too much money or too little. The clients 
should in their applications for social welfare allowances state all relevant economic 
information (that contained already given allowances of other kinds). The important 
task of the social welfare officers was to check the validity of this information. She (in 
most cases it was a female) needed to contact several national agencies to check the 
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figures. This was a cumbersome work. There were many different types of allowances to 
keep in mind and to check for the social welfare officer. It took a lot of time to collect 
and check all relevant information since this was made mainly through telephone calls. 
It was experienced as difficult to collect this information, which had the consequence 
that some relevant information might be missed. The consequence could be a lack of 
information as a decision basis. The oral transfer of information over the telephone was 
not considered safe. Sometimes misunderstandings could occur concerning allowances, 
periods and amounts. The consequence could be erroneous information as a decision 
basis. This could be the case if the applicants had submitted (unwittingly or intention-
ally) erroneous information and the social welfare officer had not checked its validity.
The social welfare officers complained that it took so much time to collect and check 
the information for the applicants. This paperwork hindered them to interact with the 
clients and give them support in their vulnerable situations. The social welfare officers 
wanted to have more time to work directly with the clients in helpful ways.
The insecure and cumbersome situation with information collection and transfer 
did not only result in information shortage and information error. It could also, in 
some instances, lead to information surplus. It was hard for the case handlers at the na-
tional agencies, in stressful telephone calls, to check the authorization of the municipal 
officers to retrieve personal information about clients. There was an obvious risk that 
too much information was delivered in relation to privacy regulations. This problem 
analysis has been summarized in table 2 expressing cause-effect relationships. What is 
characterized as a cause can be reasons for action, i.e.,a kind of teleological explanation.
This problem analysis was based on certain apprehended values in the different 
workpractices. An articulation of goals as a basis for the design was made. They can be 
summarized as follows:
• Efficient social welfare case handling
• Correct decisions on social welfare allowances
• (Time for) adequate support to social welfare clients
• Privacy in social welfare case handling (avoidance of information surplus)
It had been legislative obstacles for an efficient digital transfer of information in the 
social welfare sector due to restrictive privacy concerns. A new statute had however been 
issued that gave better possibilities for a direct digital transfer of specified information 
about clients from national agencies to municipalities. This opened a window for a new 
digital design that was exploited in this research project.
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This legislative change was a new strength in the workpractice. The analysis of what-is 
was not only based on a problem investigation. A kind of appreciative inquiry was also 
performed. The following strengths of the governmental practices were identified:
Cause Effect
Erroneous information about clients and/or lack 
of information about clients.
Erroneous social welfare allowance decisions.
No information submitted by clients and no 
collection of client information is made from 
national agencies.
Lack of information about clients (information 
shortage).
Cumbersome and time-consuming to collect 
client information and/or many other allowances 
to keep in mind and check.
No collection of client information is made from 
national agencies.
Misunderstandings in telephone communication 
between the municipality and national agency 
and/or client have submitted erroneous 
information (on purpose or by mistake).
Erroneous information about clients.
Cumbersome and time-consuming to collect 
client information.
Lack of time for social welfare officers to work 
with direct support to clients.
Hard to check authorization during stressful 
telephone calls.
Information given to officers without 
authorization (information surplus).
Table 2. Problem statements as cause-effect relationships
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• New legislation that permits an immediate digital transfer of client information 
from national agencies to municipalities
• There existed digital resources (registers) at the national agencies that contained 
relevant information about clients for case handling of social welfare allowances
• Committed social welfare officers with ambitions to give proper support to social 
welfare clients
It was important in the DS study to obtain a deep understanding of the current practice 
as a basis for the design of new IT artifacts. As can be seen above, this evaluation of 
current practice included investigations of problems, goals, and strengths.
4.2 Design of new IT artifacts
A new digital solution was developed consisting of several interoperating IT artifacts. As 
said above, a multi-query application was developed for the social welfare departments 
in municipalities. This IT artifact is used by social welfare officers to send queries to all 
relevant national agencies for the collection of economic information about applicants. 
The resulting answers are presented in a well-structured way in a user-interface, which 
is easy to navigate between overview and many details. This digital solution was devel-
oped according to the new legislation. The digital transfer of information was restricted 
to those items explicitly mentioned in the new statute. However, the Data Inspection 
Board complained that the digital solution was not secure enough. It is stated in the 
regulations that there must be an open welfare case and that there should be technical 
obstacles to state queries concerning other persons. A new solution was designed as a 
result of these complaints. The multi-query application was furnished with new func-
tionality. After this change, the software application could check that there was an open 
welfare case by reading the database of the social welfare case system. Only after this 
check, it was possible to send a query to the national agencies.
In figure 1, there is a structured description of primary artifact functions and their 
relations to workpractice goals. The artifact functions have been divided into 1) ex-
ternal properties (i.e.,functions directly related to users) and 2) conditional properties 
(i.e.,internal or structural functions). External functions serve the users directly and 
conditional functions influence the external functions of the artifact.
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5 Towards a clarified design science epistemology
5.1 Epistemic types in design science studies
The literature analysis produced a list of preliminary epistemic types (section 3.5): 
explanatory knowledge, predictive knowledge, normative knowledge, prescriptive 
knowledge, categorial knowledge, evaluative knowledge, and prospective knowledge. 
The analysis of the empirical case in section 4 has added three epistemic types to this 
list. Evaluative knowledge was developed in the DS case. There were studies of prob-
lems and strengths in the studied practice (see section 4.1). This means that evaluative 
knowledge can be of two kinds; negative evaluations (problems) and positive evalua-
tions (strengths). Evaluative knowledge that describes problems will be labeled critical 
knowledge. Evaluative knowledge that describes strengths will be labeled appreciative 
knowledge. The empirical analysis featured also properties of IT artifacts to be an im-
portant knowledge type. Different conditional and external properties of the IT artifact 
were described (figure 1). The designed IT artifact is a central object in the DS study 
(categorial knowledge), and this designed object appears with certain properties. The 
knowledge of such (designed) properties will be called attributive knowledge. These three 
types (critical knowledge, appreciative knowledge, attributive knowledge) are added to 
the list of epistemic types from section 3.5. It seems that the investigated literature 
Digital queries 
are submitted 









































Figure 1. Structured description of conditional and external properties of the IT artifacts, and 
workpractice goals
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(section 3) was not sufficiently specific about such knowledge types. A juxtaposition of 
these different epistemic types is made in table 3.
Table 3 lists the epistemic types (first column) and clarifies them through a principal 
clause (second column) and illustrates them through examples from the social welfare 
case (third column). This empirical illustration implies also that all epistemic types can 
be said to exist in the empirical case.
Some more comments need to be done to the list in table 3. One epistemic type 
(from the preliminary list in section 3.5) has been excluded: predictive knowledge. Pre-
dictions and explanations are considered of a similar epistemic kind. There is a common 
clause-type of cause-to-effect for both these statements. I follow here the analysis of 
theory construction made by Reynolds (1971). He equates explanation and prediction 
in principle and states that the difference lies in temporality: “Predicting events that will 
occur in the future and explaining events that have occurred in the past are, except for a 
difference in temporal perspective, essentially the same activity as long as scientific state-
ments are abstract” (ibid. p. 3; my emphasis). To this one can add, that an explanation 
seems usually to be directed from a phenomenon (considered as an effect) to stating its 
efficacious cause, and that a prediction seems usually to be directed from a phenome-
non (considered as a cause) to stating its potential effect. There exist, however, scholars 
in IS that differentiate between explanatory and predictive theories. Gregor (2006) sees 
predictions as weaker than a strict causality. Predictions are statements that contain 
“correlations between two variables [that] does not necessarily imply a causal relation-
ship” (ibid. p. 626). It is, however, stated by the same author that “this type of theory in 
IS do not come readily to hand, suggesting that they are not common” (ibid. p. 626). 
My conclusion is, following Reynolds (1971), that we do not need predictive knowl-
edge as a separate epistemic type in a design science epistemology. Predictive knowledge 
is mainly covered by explanatory knowledge. It can also be covered by the special cases 
of causal statements that are prospective knowledge (proposed and hypothetical means-
to-end knowledge) and prescriptive knowledge (validated means-to-end knowledge). 
The relationships between explanatory, prospective and prescriptive knowledge will be 
explained in more detail in section 5.2.
A further comment on explanatory knowledge and causality is needed. In table 
3, explanatory knowledge is defined through causality in the following way “stating 
that something (=cause) influences/produces something (=effect)”. In an IS context, 
this should not be interpreted always in a strict deterministic way. Depending on the 
characters of phenomena, the relationship between the cause and its effect will vary. 
In the social realm, there exist intentional and value-seeking human action and social 
interaction based on affordances in instruments and interpretations of meaning (Blum-
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Principal clause Example (from social welfare case)
Evaluative 
knowledge
Stating that something is assessed to 
be in some way
See examples of problems and strengths
Critical 
knowledge
Stating that something is considered 
to be negative (=problem)
Cumbersome and time-consuming to collect 
client information about clients
Appreciative 
knowledge
Stating that something is considered 
to be positive (=strength)
Committed social welfare officers with 




Stating that something is desirable 
(=goal)




Stating that something (=cause) 
influences/produces something 
(=effect)
Lack of information about clients can give 
erroneous social welfare allowances decisions
Prospective 
knowledge
Stating that something is possible Social welfare artifact with immediate 
exposure of client information may 




Stating how to (=means) reach 
something desirable (=end)
Social welfare artifact with immediate 
exposure of client information contributes 
to correct decisions on welfare allowances
Categorial 
knowledge
Stating that something exists Information about clients
Attributive 
knowledge
Stating properties of something Shortage of client information
Table 3. Different epistemic types in design science explained through principal clauses and 
illustrative examples
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er 1969; Gibson 1979; Habermas 1984; Winch 1990). This constitutes an efficacy 
between conditions and effects with a softer socio-pragmatic causality. There might be 
cases with a strict necessity between cause and effect as e.g.,the execution of software 
code in a computing machine. There will be other cases involving human interpreta-
tion/action and social interaction where causes/conditions will influence/facilitate the 
production of effects without any strict necessity. Such different forms of causality are 
accounted for in IS research (Markus and Robey 1988; Hovorka et al. 2008; Gregor 
and Hovorka 2011).
5.2 A conceptual map: Relationships between epistemic types
The design science epistemology is visualized through a conceptual map (figure 2) 
of different knowledge types that are relevant in design science. The conceptual map 
depicts knowledge types (boxes) and semantic relationships (arrows) between them. 
Arrows do not describe sequences or processes. An arrow indicates a reading direc-
tion of the semantic relation as common in conceptual models. The basic structure 
of this model follows the epistemic logic of the three stages with their corresponding 
primary epistemic types (pre-design evaluative and explanatory knowledge; in-design 
prospective knowledge; post-design prescriptive knowledge); cf. table 1. These primary 
knowledge types are dependent on and built up from other more basic epistemic types. 
In-design knowledge is key characterized as design hypothesis and post-design knowledge 
as design principle. These concepts will be further elaborated below.
Explanatory knowledge plays important roles in all three stages. The roles are how-
ever differing which will be shown below. Explanatory knowledge is built from the two 
parts in the clause; the cause-part and the effect-part. Certain categorized phenomena 
are related causally through these explanatory clauses. Each part can be said to comprise 
a description of some phenomenon. Phenomena can be 1) objects or processes and 2) 
different properties of them. This can be seen to be a kind of realist ontology (Evermann 
and Wand 2005), however, expanded beyond plain physical objects to include social/
institutional objects (Searle 1995; March and Allen 2014). There can be institutional 
objects talked about such as applications and decisions (following the social welfare 
case from above). Explanatory knowledge is built up from descriptive knowledge about 
the world (figure 2). Such descriptive knowledge is here, following the realist ontology 
mentioned, differentiated into 1) knowledge that identifies and categorizes objects or 
processes (categorial knowledge) and 2) knowledge of attributive kind, i.e.,character-
izing objects/processes by stating properties of them. This fundamental division into 
objects, processes, and properties is directly reflected in language through the use of 
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nouns, verbs, and adjectives (Wittgenstein 1958). It is far beyond the scope of this pa-
per to dig further into an appropriate socio-technical ontology for IS design science; cf. 
Goldkuhl, (2002; 2019) for more elaborate distinctions. Only some elementary con-
stituents of a socio-technical world are described here as fundamental building blocks 
for explanatory statements (see above and below).
In the pre-design stage, the focus is on the current practice situation. Evaluations are 
made partially based on explanatory cause-to-effect descriptions of the current situation. 
As described in the empirical case, there can be evaluative statements about problems 
(i.e.,critical knowledge) and about strengths (i.e.,appreciative knowledge). Such knowl-







































































Figure 2. Conceptual map: Epistemic types of design science knowledge
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why something is considered negative or positive. Normative knowledge is necessary in 
order to detect any deviation between current situation and desired situation. As part 
of the pre-design background knowledge, there can also be explanatory knowledge of 
abstract character as selected kernel theories from the scholarly knowledge base.
Explanatory knowledge is also used in the in-design and post-design stages but in 
another shape. Here, the cause-to-effect clause is transformed into a means-to-end clause 
(Goldkuhl 2004). Means-to-end clauses are prescriptive because the end is desired. 
However, in design science it should be important to differentiate between 1) hypothet-
ical means-to-end clauses occurring during design as a kind of prospective knowledge, 
describing hypothetical and desirable possibilities however not yet finalized (in-design 
knowledge) and 2) validated means-to-end clauses that are justified through observations 
of use-situations (post-design knowledge). The latter will give rise to proper prescrip-
tions, i.e.,advising certain means to instantiate in order to reach certain desired states 
(i.e.,ends). A means-to-end clause as in-design knowledge is characterized as a design 
hypothesis since it describes an anticipated artifact property and its relationships to use 
situations. A means-to-end clause as post-design knowledge is characterized as a design 
principle since it expresses prescriptive knowledge of an artifact property that may con-
tribute to a desired use situation.
Prospective knowledge (belonging to in-design knowledge) is thus considered to be 
hypothetical means-to-end knowledge. This may comprise ideas about artifact proper-
ties (i.e.,means) and how such properties may contribute to a desired practice situation 
(i.e.,end). Prescriptive knowledge (belonging to post-design knowledge) is thus con-
sidered to be validated means-to-end knowledge. It is, however, important to add that 
there will probably be a gradual shift from the prospective in-design knowledge to the 
prescriptive post-design knowledge. Different projected design ideas may be visualized 
in models and later instantiated in prototypes more or less advanced. During an iter-
ative use of models and prototypes, design ideas are gradually shaped and also given 
more credibility. Ideas and possibilities are becoming real through building, testing and 
evaluating. Formative evaluation efforts during the design phase may contribute with 
evaluative knowledge to a continual refinement of the design.
In order for post-design knowledge to reach the level of prescriptive design theories 
(Walls et al. 1992; Gregor and Jones 2007) there needs to be empirical evaluations of 
artifact use situations. Results from such post-evaluations can be abstractions of em-
pirical data in the form of explanatory cause-to-effect clauses. These explanations can 
be transformed into prescriptive means-to-end clauses (Goldkuhl 2004; Kuechler and 
Vaishnavi 2012). This means that prescriptive means-to-end knowledge will build on 
evaluative knowledge of testing and using an artifact. Prescriptive post-design knowl-
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edge is seen as a transformation of such post-evaluative knowledge. It will be a result of 
a summative evaluation of artifact use.
As can be seen from above, evaluation will occur at different stages of a design sci-
ence process, which also has been noted by several scholars (e.g.,Sonnenberg and vom 
Brocke 2012; Baskerville et al. 2015). Evaluation can be performed following different 
strategies (how), on different evaluation objects (what) and aiming for different kinds 












Current practice Establish a diagnosis background 
for design (explanations, values)
In-design Formative evaluation 
during design
Emergent design ideas 
described in models and 
prototypes







Use of designed artifact in 
practice
Validation of design principles 
(prescriptions)
Table 4. Different kinds of evaluation in design science studies
5.3 Design principles as outcomes from design science studies
Before post-design knowledge can be claimed to have reached the level of a proper de-
sign theory such knowledge can be expressed as design principles (Gregor and Hevner 
2013) possibly in a nascent design theory. A design principle, according to Sein et al. 
(2011) and discussed in section 3.3 above, expresses some property of an artifact and 
it can be related to desired states in the practice context. This follows a means-to-end 
pattern. The structured relationships between different artifact properties and practice 
goals, as described in figure 1 of the design case above, seem to equate such a design 
principle of Sein et al. (2011). When using a proposed terminology of artifact proper-
ties and practice goals, there is no need to use any terminology of meta-requirements 
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and meta-designs as in Walls et al. (1992). This proposed approach also sharpens what 
is a feature of the artifact and what is an effect of using such an artifact-feature.
The basic means-to-end clause in IS design science (following the examples from the 
empirical case) has the following basic structure:
• Means: functional and external property of the IT artifact 
• End: desired workpractice situation (i.e.,some desired fundamental value)
There can also be sub-means such as conditional artifact properties (cf. figure 1). The 
external artifact properties are dependent on such conditional properties. It is impor-
tant to acknowledge that the means are, not only artifacts as such, but specific properties 
of artifacts. Such knowledge is attributive knowledge, i.e.,an expression of some specific 
property of an object (in this case an IT artifact). This can be exemplified with ‘client 
information is immediately exposed’ as a functional property of the focused IT artifact. 
Ends (goals) are situations in practices where some desirable feature is emphasized in 
such a situation (e.g.,correct, efficient, available, protected). A feature is of course not 
just a feature; it is a property of something. This can be exemplified by ‘Correct deci-
sions on social welfare allowances’, where ‘correct’ is an attribute of the object ‘decision 
on social welfare allowances’.
As stated above, a design principle from a DS study may typically consist of such 
a means-to-end clause; i.e.,a property of an IT artifact may contribute to a desired 
practice situation. Figure 3 illustrates the structure of design principles including both 






















Figure 3. Structure and dependencies of a design principle as an outcome from a design science 
study
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means/means are constituted by categorial and attributive knowledge: IT artifact (as 
category) with certain properties (as attributes). The end, as a desired practice situa-
tion, is constituted by such categorial and attributive knowledge with the important 
addition that the attribute is considered as something valuable; i.e.,a kind of normative 
knowledge. The design principle should not be a mere design hypothesis (as prospective 
knowledge), but it should be the result of some empirical and evaluative study. In figure 
3, this is illustrated, by stating that a design principle is dependent on evaluative cause-
to-effect knowledge. This type of evaluative knowledge should be seen as appreciative 
since it emphasizes positive aspects of practices and IT artifacts.
It should be noted that conceptualizing knowledge in means-to-end chains is usual-
ly a matter of relative characterization. Something that is considered a means, can also 
be considered as an end in relation to its sub-means. To exemplify, a functional property 
of an IT artifact that is instrumental (i.e.,a means) in relation to desired practice situa-
tion, can also be considered as an objective for design, i.e.,in this case an intermediate 
goal that is dependent on different sub-means. This implies that an artifact property can 
be considered a means or an end depending on its role in means-to-end clauses.
5.4 Knowledge grounding
The conceptual map in figure 2 uses different epistemic types and clarifies the relation-
ships between them. As can be seen from the clauses and examples in table 3, these dif-
ferent knowledge types have different sentence forms. This means also that these knowl-
edge types need different grounding principles following Habermas (1984) as stated 
above (section 2.2) when introducing the notion of epistemic type. The principle ways 
of grounding these different epistemic types are shown in table 5. Some examples of 
these groundings are explicated here. The two types of evaluative knowledge (problems, 
strengths) need to be descriptively correct; i.e.,they should be considered veracious. The 
specific evaluative type (problem vs. strength) needs to be justified argumentatively. 
Something that is claimed to be a problem needs to be motivated as something that is 
deemed negative in the practice. Something that is claimed to be a strength needs to be 
motivated as something that is deemed positive in the practice. In table 5, there are also 
references to literature for these different epistemic types; i.e.,this table functions also as 
a kind of theoretical grounding of the different epistemic types.
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Way of grounding Theoretical basis
Evaluative 
knowledge
Descriptive correspondence and 
assessment motivation
Dewey (1938); House and Howe (1999)
Critical 
knowledge
Descriptive correspondence and 
problem motivation
Dewey (1938); Rittel and Webber (1973)
Appreciative 
knowledge
Descriptive correspondence and 
strength motivation
Ludema et al. (2001)
Normative 
knowledge
Motivated volition House and Howe (1999); Rescher (2000)
Explanatory 
knowledge
Descriptive correspondence and 
adequate abstraction




Innovativeness and valuable to explore Dewey (1938); Lubart (2000)
Prescriptive 
knowledge




Existence and proper abstraction Searle (1969); Strauss and Corbin (1998); 




Existence and proper characterization Searle (1969); Strauss and Corbin (1998); 
Evermann and Wand (2005)
Table 5. Different epistemic types in design science described through ways of grounding and 
theoretical basis (literature references)
As described above, in design science there are differentiations made 1) between situ-
ational problems and abstract classes of problems and 2) between specific designs and 
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abstract classes of solutions (e.g.,Lee et al. 2011; Sein et al. 2011; Gregor and Hevner 
2013). How is the presented design science epistemology related to this dichotomy? A 
proper design science study should alternate in a constructive and generative manner 
between a situational design focus and an abstract theorizing orientation. This means 
that all epistemic types can be expressed in 1) a specific and situational manner aiming 
for a specific artifact design and in 2) a de-contextualized and abstract manner aiming 
for design principles and design theory.
6 Discussion and conclusions 
6.1 Utilizing design science epistemology
How can this knowledge of DSE be used in research processes and publications from 
such research? The phasing of design science described in this paper is important to 
acknowledge; i.e.,the stages of pre-design, in-design and post-design. There are differ-
ent primary epistemic types associated with these different stages; background evalua-
tive and explanatory knowledge in pre-design, prospective means-to-end knowledge in 
in-design, and prescriptive means-to-end knowledge in post-design. The design science 
scholar needs to be well aware of these different epistemic types and address each of 
them in fitted ways. These different primary epistemic types rely also on supportive 
knowledge of other epistemic types, which can be seen in the conceptual map (figure 
2) and also in textual descriptions above (especially section 5). The design science epis-
temology contributes useful knowledge of relationships between different epistemic 
types in such a research process. The epistemological classification can be used as a 
complement to existing process models in design science, such as Peffers et al. (2007) 
and Kuechler and Vaishnavi (2012)/Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2015). In table 6, these 
two process models have been mapped together with identified knowledge types asso-
ciated with each process stage. Through a close reading of these publications, different 
knowledge types have been identified and related to each process stage in table 6. A 
fourth column, in this table, contains identified epistemic types from the presented 
DSE. This can be compared with the knowledge types in the two DS process models 
(columns two and three). The epistemological classification of DSE in this paper has a 
more comprehensive epistemic content than the two established process models.
In the two process models, there is an emphasis (in pre-design) on identification 
of problems. The DS epistemology adds evaluative strength knowledge to this. An ap-
preciative inquiry is important in order to identify not yet exploited opportunities and 
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practice traits that should be sustained in a change process. Glimpses of normative 
knowledge in pre-design can be found in Peffers et al (2007): “Define the specific re-
search problem and justify the value of a solution” (ibid. p. 52; my emphasis). To this, 
one must add the importance to articulate and apply normative knowledge for a proper 
evaluation of current situation. An empirical evaluation of current situation is in DSE 
also paralleled by theoretical inquiries into the knowledge base of background explan-
Knowledge 
stage








Pre-design Problem identification and 
motivation (problems, value 
motivation)























Post-design Demonstration (knowledge 
for artifact use).
Evaluation (knowledge of 
artifact use)
Communication (relevant 
aspects of DS study)
Demonstration
(knowledge for artifact 
use)
Evaluation
(knowledge of artifact 
use)
Communication
(relevant aspects of DS 
study)
Prescriptive knowledge
(design principles = 
means-to-end)
Evaluative/explanatory 
knowledge of artifact 
use
Normative knowledge
Table 6. Knowledge types in design science process models
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atory theories to reach an adequate theoretical grounding of design proposals. This is 
also emphasized by Kuechler and Vaishnavi (2012) but in their process model placed in 
direct relation to in-design (the suggestion stage).
Ideational knowledge in the in-design stage is emphasized by Vaishnavi and Kuechler 
(2015) in a separate suggestion sub-stage. Peffers et al. (2007) have clarification of ob-
jectives (i.e.,normative knowledge) in a preceding sub-stage before designing. In addi-
tion to these knowledge types, DSE emphasizes prospective knowledge as an explicit 
clarification of means-to-end, i.e.,functional relationships between artifact properties 
and desired practice situations. DSE acknowledges also formative evaluations of design 
hypotheses that may occur in different degrees of manifestation.
In the post-design stage, both referenced process models acknowledge the need for 
evaluation of artifact use. Kuechler and Vaishnavi (2012) are explicit about explana-
tory/prescriptive design theory as a primary outcome from DS. In DSE, the essential 
outcome from post-design is seen as design principle as a transformation and validation 
of design hypothesis from in-design.
Scholars that follow any of these two established DS process models can thus add 
some more epistemological reflection and articulation in different stages (table 5). The 
presented DS epistemology does not prescribe an exhaustive use of epistemic types in 
all DS studies. It contains a map with different epistemic types and relationships be-
tween them. There will always be an open issue in each DS endeavor how ambitious the 
epistemological development should be conducted.
The presented design science epistemology could also influence the way a DS study 
is reported in a scholarly publication. Gregor and Hevner (2013) have made a thorough 
proposal for how to structure a design science publication. They present a publica-
tion schema with seven sections (summarized below in table 7; first column) and they 
comment similarities with and differences to an ordinary empirical paper. In general, 
the presented DS epistemology fits well into their publication schema. However, some 
amendments are possible to make to their publication schema if one follows the struc-
ture, contents, and insights of DSE more faithfully. A slightly modified publication 
schema is suggested in table 7 (second column). The two publication schemas are de-
scriptively compared in table 7 and also in the text below. Table 7 contains some key 
characteristics in parentheses for each schema and section. These characterizations are 
formulated in ways compliant to the terminologies of each approach. This means that 
in some cases the differences are more terminological than conceptual.
Pre-design, through evaluative knowledge of problems and strengths in current 
practices, is emphasized in DSE. Gregor and Hevner (2013) include such knowledge in 
the introductory section. In the DSE variant, this knowledge is considered as vital for 
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the DS process and it has therefore been given a separate section (2). There is a section 4 
in Gregor and Hevner (2013) containing artifact description. They describe the content 
of this section to “include … perhaps, the design search (development) process that 
led to the discovery of the artifact design” (ibid. p. 350). In DSE, the in-design stage is 
Gregor and Hevner publication schema DSE publication schema
1. Introduction (problem definition and 
significance; purpose and scope of artifact; 
research objectives)
1. Introduction (general background and 
purpose of research)
2. Diagnostic base (pre-design evaluative 
knowledge with explicit normative reflection)
2. Literature review (extant descriptive and 
prescriptive knowledge)
3. Literature review (explanatory knowledge 
from knowledge base)
3. Method (applied research approach) 4. Method (emphasizing the epistemic logic)
4. Artifact description (description of artifact; 
possibly design search/development process)
5. Design process (emergence of design 
hypotheses; formative evaluation in in-design)
6. Artifact description (conditional and external 
properties of artifact)
5. Evaluation (criteria for and result from 
evaluation)
7. Post-evaluation (evaluative knowledge 
with relationships between artifact properties 
and practice situation; founded in normative 
knowledge)
6. Discussion (interpretation of results; in 
some cases, extraction of design principles; 
implications of results; summary)
8. Design principles (explication of prescriptive 
means-to-end knowledge)
7. Conclusions (important findings) 9. Concluding discussion (implications; 
summary)
Table 7. Design science publication schemas: a comparison
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considered as vital and hence also the reporting of this knowledge process. Therefore, 
the optional remark by Gregor and Hevner (“included ... perhaps”) (2013) is consid-
ered as too weak. This in-design part of the DS process is given a separate section in 
the DSE schema: “Section 4 Design process”. The focus should be on the emergence 
of design hypotheses based on alternations between building and formative evaluation. 
This can be equated with the view of explicating a theory through the description of 
the theorizing process of interim struggles with intermediate results (Weick 1995). De-
sign principles (as means-to-end knowledge) are considered in DSE as a key outcome 
from a design science study. It is an outcome from the post-design stage and it builds 
upon knowledge from the two previous stages. In the DSE schema, this prescriptive 
knowledge has a more prominent place in a separate section (8 Design principles). In 
the Gregor and Hevner (2013) schema, presentation of design principles was included 
as one part in the Discussions section (6). Other parts (such as implications) in this 
Discussions section have (in DSE schema proposal) been moved to the last section (9 
Concluding discussion). As Gregor and Hevner (2013, p. 350-351) state “there is often 
difficulty representing the design of a complex artifact in the space that is allowed in 
a journal”. The Gregor and Hevner (2013) publication schema is ambitious, and the 
DSE schema can be considered as even more ambitious. This points to dividing the 
reporting into several papers. There exist several possible strategies for dividing a DS 
study into several papers. One possibility is slicing the artifact into different clusters 
of artifact properties. Each such property cluster can be described in a comprehensive 
way concerning pre-design, in-design and post-design following either of the two pub-
lication schemas (table 7). Another publication strategy is to divide the publications 
along with the DS staging. For example, a three-paper presentation could consist of: 
1) one paper with a focus on pre-design knowledge (background evaluations) including 
sketchy design proposals (prospective in-design knowledge) as potential responses to 
identified problems; and 2) one paper with in-depth descriptions of artifact properties 
(in-design knowledge) with hypothetical use-effects as desired ends (design hypotheses) 
including references to background knowledge motivating the suggested designs; and 
3) one paper with focus on prescriptive post-design knowledge (design principles), where 
validations of proposed design properties are presented.
The suggestions above are concerned with concrete aspects of DS research (manage-
ment of DS process and publications). The DS epistemology can also be used to stim-
ulate further philosophical reflection on DS in IS. This paper has taken a pragmatist 
stance in its inquiry and how to conceptualize different epistemic types. There are other 
possible angles for philosophical reflections as stated by other scholars; e.g.,interpretiv-
ism (Niehaves 2007) and critical realism (Carlsson 2010).
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This paper has, through an empirically informed epistemological inquiry, shown the di-
versity of design science epistemology. There is a rich epistemological landscape to address 
in design science and there is a great need for DS scholars to be well aware of different 
epistemic types and the respective ways of how to express and ground such differing 
knowledge. This paper has contributed a clarification of a design science epistemology 
with different epistemic types related to different stages of the design science process. 
Different epistemic types have been exemplified through an empirical case. Ways to ex-
press knowledge types have been proposed in principal clauses. Ways of grounding have 
been clarified for each epistemic type. This design science epistemology, provides DS 
scholars with instruments 1) to plan the DS knowledge progression process, 2) to char-
acterize different knowledge items epistemologically (i.e.,to assign each to an epistemic 
type), 3) which helps scholars to the find suitable ways for grounding this knowledge 
and to report them properly.
In a simplified differentiation between behavioral science and design science, the 
former is associated with truth of what-is and the latter with utility and prescriptions 
for what-to-be. Such a differentiation overlooks the overlaps and similarities between 
behavioral science and design science. In order to create new artifacts and prescriptive 
knowledge for the design of artifacts, there is a need to acknowledge the artifacts and 
the corresponding new prescriptive knowledge as a response to problematic situations 
of what-is. Truthful knowledge about current situations (what-is) is indispensable in 
research through design. Evaluative and explanatory knowledge is a necessary starting 
point of design science studies. Evaluative and explanatory knowledge is also a nec-
essary end point of design science endeavors since it is through such knowledge that 
design principles and prescriptions within a design theory are grounded.
This paper has also added to the discourse on what makes a design science study, 
with its focus on designing artifacts, to a scientific endeavor. Previously, arguments have 
been stated that it is the degree of innovation and novelty that is significant (Hevner 
et al. 2004) or the rigor in the development process (Iivari 2007). My main argument 
is that a design science study should produce artifacts and grounded knowledge con-
nected to those artifacts. If no grounded knowledge is produced, it is hard to claim the 
study to be scientific. This makes us turn to epistemology and argumentative ration-
ality (Habermas 1984; Goldkuhl 2004) as foundations for a design science process. A 
key characteristic in DSE is the inherent knowledge progression from evaluative back-
ground knowledge to design hypotheses and design principles.
What is next for this design science epistemology, i.e.,what about future research? 
The obvious and primary use and influence are to apply it as a guide for developing, 
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validating and expressing different types of knowledge in DS studies and to report 
about experiences from such use. The hope that follows with this paper is to get DS 
scholars better prepared to navigate in the complex epistemological landscape of DS 
and to focus on those knowledge types that are important in their DS endeavors in 
order to produce impactful design science studies. This DS epistemology might also be 
used as an instrument for investigating design science studies/publications in retrospect 
in order to push existing DS knowledge further. Such different uses may inform further 
development of this design science epistemology. A more radical future research task 
would be to use the developed design science epistemology as a foundation for a more 
thorough re-conceptualization of design science and its different sub-activities such as 
problem articulation, design thinking, artifact creation, evaluation, data generation, 
and theorizing.
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